Marquette Law Review
Volume 1
Issue 3 Volume 1, Issue 3 (1917)

Article 3

Spurious and Questioned Documents
Edward W. Spencer
Milwaukee Bar

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr
Part of the Law Commons
Repository Citation
Edward W. Spencer, Spurious and Questioned Documents, 1 Marq. L. Rev. (1917).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr/vol1/iss3/3

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Marquette Law Review by an authorized administrator of Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact
megan.obrien@marquette.edu.

SPURIOUS AND QUESTIONED DOCUMENTS
By EDWARD W. SPENCER, of the Milwaukee Bar.
Former Associate Dean Marquette Law School;
Author of a Treatise on Suretyship, Domestic Relations, etc.

INTRODUCTORY.
"Assuredly nature would prompt every
individual to have a distinct writing,
as she has given a peculiar countenance, voice, and manner."-Disraeli.
The present subject naturally embraces a very wide and
interesting field of legal and judicial inquiry and discussion,
for upon the authorship, authenticity or genuineness of a particular writing or document may depend issues of the greatest
consequence involving public as well as private interests, including the guilt or innocence of individuals with respect to the
gravest and most disgraceful legal or social offenses. Witness.
for example many of the English State trials, the so-called
"Morey Letters" which might have cost James A. Garfield the
presidency in the campaign of i88o; the Patrick-Rice will;
the Mollineaux murder case; the Webster murder case;
the Fair will; the Crawford will; and many other testamentary causes involving enormous estates, and the thousands of other questions and cases of varying interest and
importance that have hinged upon documentary authorship,
from the forged Decretals of Isidorus and the "Junius Letters,"
down to the latest vulgar check forgery or threatening or obscene
letter. Indeed, few lawyers are long in active practice without
having to deal with questions, litigated or otherwise, involving
the authorship or authenticity of handwritings. Furthermore
the advent of the typewriter has complicated and in some sense
widened the field of investigation of questioned documents, and
it is often possible by means of broken or misplaced letters and
similar data, to identify the machine used in a given case with
a certainty amounting to practical demonstration, or to determine the date of a document, or at least to exclude the possibility
of a particular date, by reference to the style of type and other
characteristics of the different machines in use at the time it is
claimed or purports to have originated.'
i.

See Osborn, Questioned Documents, Chap. XXV.
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It seems highly desirable, therefore, that the practitioner
should have sufficient technical knowledge, not merely to apply
the rules of evidence peculiar to handwriting cases, but to form
some intelligent office opinion with respect to questioned writings and to enable him to properly deal with such witnesses, expert or otherwise, both before and at the trial, as may
2
appear in this branch of his case.
For this reason we will, after reviewing generally the rules
of evidence involved, endeavor to show what tests may, and
should ordinarily, be applied in determining the facts or forming
an opinion as to them. At the same time no attempt will be
made to accomplish the impossible by exploring in detail the
entire field covered by the work of the so-called handwriting
specialist or expert.
MODES OF PROOF-ENGLISH AND AMERICAN
COMMON LAW.
Obviously, anyone who saw a writing executed or to circumstances leading up or pointing back to its execution, is competent to testify to its authorship upon the same principle that an
eye witness may testify to the striking of a blow or to circumstances showing that a blow has been struck. Generally, also
anyone is competent to testify (give an opinion) as to the authorship of a given writing, who is familiar with the handwriting
of the alleged author, either by seeing him write, or by acquiring
familiarity with his handwriting by carrying on correspondence
with him, or through other opportunities of observing writing
which there was reasonable ground for presuming to be his ;8
and the jury have been quite generally held qualified to examine
- nd compare the" questioned writing and such other writings as
are already in evidence for some other purpose and relevant to
the issue.4a
2. See the author's introduction to Osborn, Questioned Documents.
3. I Best. Ev. (ist Am. Ed.) 45o. According to the older notion
which persisted as late as 1798, the evidence of witnesses who had not seen
the party write but had become conversant with his writing through correspondence, etc., was rejected unless witnesses who had seen him write
were not available.
Sheare's Trial, 27 How. St. Tr. 323.
See Eagleton v. Kingston, 8 Ves. 473 per Eldon L. C.
4a. See 3 Wigm. Ev. §§ 2000, 2001.
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EXTRINSIC STANDARDS-DOE vs. SUCKERMORE.
But the chief point of dispute and of variance in the decisions has been, and in some jurisdictions still is, whether other
writings other than those already admitted as relevant to the
case may be introduced for purposes of comparison by manual
juxtaposition with the disputed writing. "And it certainly is a
technicality calculated to astound anyone but a lawyer that precludes going out and getting the genuine writing of the person
whose penmanship is in dispute for purpose of comparison,"
particularly in view of the fact that millions of dollars in money
and property change hands every day upon the basis of a mere
scratch of a pen-that the business of the world in fact depends
largely upon the identity of handwriting.
Without reviewing the older history of the matter which has
been carefully and learnedly examined by Prof. Wigmore, 4 b the
English law apparently crystalized, or at least was first fairly
reduced to a basis of reasons, though not wholly of reason, in
Doe d. Mudd vs. SuckermoreSa decided in 1836, "which, as its
title implies, has not tended to clarify the stream of justice."
This case excluded, not all standards of comparison in handwriting cases, but all standards that were not already in the case
as relevant for some other purpose. This meant, of course, that
without such standards, without witnesses who had seen the
party write or who were familiar with his writing, the triers of
fact often had little to help them but the questioned writing,
their sense of duty and the guidance of Almighty God. The
principal reasons given in Doe vs. Suckerinore and in subsequent
cases for the exclusion of extraneous standards are three: (i)
ignorance of jurors, and their inability to make intelligent comparison; (2) danger of unfairness and fraud in the selection of
specimens, which the opposing party had no opportunity to investigate and expose; (3) the danger of collateral issues as to the
genuineness of specimens presented. To these reasons may prob4b. See 3 Ev. sec. 1991 et seq. and the exhaustive note to University
of Illinois v. Spalding in 62 L. R. A. 817 et seq.
It seems that extrinsic standards were always allowed in the ecclesiastical courts. See Beaumont v. Perkins, i Phillm. 78; Crisp v. Walpole,
2 Hagg, Ecc. 535.
5a. 5 A & E, 2 Nev. & P. 16 W. W. & D, 4o5, 7 L. J. Q. B. N. S. 33 .
See also Doe v. Newton, i Nev. and P. I, 5, Ad. & El. 514 (1836),
following the same reasoning.
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ably be added a fourth which, though seldom directly expressed
as the basis of decision, seems to have pervaded and animated
the cases down to and including that case. It was the distrust
of expert testimony with respect to handwriting, or perhaps of
all conclusions based on comparison with the mere standards of
the writing in dispute, reflected in the oft-repeated phrase of
condemnation and rejection, particularly when extrinsic standards
were sought to be brought in, "comparison.of handwritings5'b
and reflected also in the frequent reiteration of the reasons given
by Lord Denman for the exception permitting the juxtaposition
of genuine writings already in the case, i. e., that "comparison
in such case is unavoidable." As to such writings he says:
"When two standards are placed before a jury, one of which is
in question, and the other is clearly known to be the handwriting
of the party, no human power can prevent the jury from forming
some opinion whether those two were written by the same person; and consequently when such is the case, and the mind of the
jury must be so employed, it is better for the court to enter into
the consideration, and to direct any observations that may occur
6
as to the value of such evidence."
Another and a better reason for admitting as standards writings already in the case as genuine, appears to be the absence of
the danger of collateral issues and the introduction of unfair
7
specimens.

5b. All proof of handwriting, save by witnesses who saw the writing
executed or can testify to some fact which lead up or points back to it,
involves in some sense comparison of hands. If the witness testifies from
a previous familiarity with the type through seeing the party write or by
familiarity with other proved or admittedly genuine writings we have comparison of the cjuestioned writing with the mental standard or exemplar
thus formed. By the later cases, however, "comparison of hands" meant
comparison by persons previously unfamiliar with the "type," who were
shown specimens in court for comparison with the writing in dispute.
This was what the common law latterly excluded and in so doing it naturally excluded a class of witnesses altogether, i. e., experts, unless genuine
standards were already in the case as relevant for some other purpose thaa
mere comparison with the disputed hand. See supra note, 3; Wigm. Ev.
§§ i99r, 1992.
6.

Doe v. Newton, i Nev. & P. 1, 5 Ad. & El. 514.

7.

I Best, Ev. sec. 239.
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When a proved or admitted standard was already in the case,
however, for some other purpose, it seems that the comparison
could be made by the jury alone,8 or by experts speaking solely
from juxtaposition,9 or by both.1O
The English law as thus expounded, with some local modifications, and differences, some of them traceable to earlier interpretations of the common law, has been the basis of subsequent
decisions in most of our courts independent of statutes, most of
which latter are comparatively recent. Proceeding to examine
the soundness of the three reasons principally urged for the
exclusion of extrinsic standards in Doe vs. Suckermore and
later cases, the first has no weight in jurisdictions where intelligence and education are general, and the second is almost equally
inconclusive, as an impartial administration of the law, allowing
equal opportunities for comparison by both parties, and allowing
both to submit standards, and subjecting both specimens and wit8. Doe v. Newton, i Nev. & P. i;
Williams v. Conger, 125 U. S. 397, 8 Sup. Ct. 933, 31 L. Ed. 778;
Kirksey v. Kirksey, 41 Ala. 626;
State v. Nettleton, i Root (Conn.) 3o8;
Welch v. Coulborn, 3 Houst. (Del.) 647;
McCafferty v. Heritage, 5 Id. 220;
Doe v. Roe, 16 Ga. 521;
McAllister v. McAllister, 7 B. Monr. (Ky.) 269;
Williams v. Drexel, 14 Md. 566;
Hunt v. Lawless, 7 Abb. N. Cas. 113;
Henderson v. Hackney, 16 Ga. 521.
See Chance v. Indianapolis,etc., Road Co., 32 Ind. 472.
Outlaw v. Hurdle, i Jones. L. (N. Car.) I5O.
In North Carolina jury comparison is not permitted. Otey v. Hoyt,
48 N. Car. 407 and note 15.
9. Doe v. Suckermore, supra.
Marn v. Crowder, 72 Ala. 79.
Chance v. Indianapolis, etc., Road Co., supra.
Merritt v. Campbell, 79 N. Y. 679.
Comp. Fee v. Taylor, 83 Ky. 259; Tome v. ParkersburgBranch Railroad Co., 39 Md. 36, 17 Am. R. 540;

io. See Pate v. People, 8 Ill. 644;
Chance v. Indianapolis, etc., Road Co., supra;
Tower v. Whip, 53 W. Va. 158, 44 S. E. i79.
See Taves v. Brown, 43 Pa. 9, 82 Am. D. 54o and cases cited and reviewed in the note to 62 L. R. A. 855 for the peculiar views in Pennsylvania prior to the act of 1895.
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nesses to the process of examination and cross-examination,
makes the danger from unfair specimens too trivial to warrant
the rejection of such important means of investigation."
The objection on the ground of the possibility of collateral
issues is more serious. Whatever be the law of a particular
jurisdiction as to extrinsic writings, the rule of exclusion still
does and must apply so long as standards are in dispute, for so
long as the standards offered and the particular writing in issue
are both in question, there can be no comparison in any proper
sense, and the submission of so-called standards to the jury could
only result in confusion, uncertainty and doubt. When the
standards are once proved as a preliminary fact to the satisfaction of the judge, however, under principles later discussed, the
difficulty disappears and no rational objection can be raised to
the opinions of "experts speaking from juxtaposition," unless
indeed, it be based upon some peril or infirmity in the very character of such evidence so serious as to warrant its exclusion
altogether, as a matter of policy. No one who is practically
familiar with the work of the intelligent conscientious handwriting expert can discover any such danger or concede many more
-cogent reasons for excluding his opinion than apply to expert
testimony in most other delicate matters of science or art.
EXCEPTIONS TO RULE EXCLUDING EXTRINSIC
STANDARDS-ANCIENT DOCUMENTS.
An exception to the rule excluding extrinsic standards has
long prevailed in the case of "ancient documents." The rule as
to these is thus stated by Mr. Best: "When a document is of
such date that it cannot be reasonably expected to find living persons acquainted with the handwriting of the supposed writer,
either by having seen him write, or by having held correspondence with him, the law, acting on the maxim, "Lex non cogit
ii. See University of Illinois v. Spalding, 71 N. H. 163, 51 Atl. 731,
62 L. R. A. 817, and authorities cited in the opinion and notes.

1Lyon v. Lyman, 9 Conn. 55;
Moody v. Rockwell, 17 Pick, (Mass.) 49o.
But see Pierce v. Northey, 14 Wis. IO,per Dixon C. J. for an able
presentation of the arguments against this view.
The statutes of some states require notice to the other side of the
standards to be submitted for comparison. See for example Ga. Code,
i895, § 5347.
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impossibilia," allows other ancient documents, which are proved
to have been treated and regularly preserved as authentic, to be
compared with the disputed one."'1 2 Neither, it should be added,
is there much if any room in such cases for the unfair selection
of specimens.' 3
Precisely what are to be deemed ancient documents within
the foregoing rule is not altogether clear,1 4 nor is it entirely
clear how they should be used. Whether the disputed writing
was to be compared with the standard by their custodian or by
one who had full opportunity to observe and note the handwriting in the ancient document and who is thus familiar with the
writing, or whether the comparison was to be visually made by
the jury, or whether it could be made and an opinion given by
experts, seems uncertain. In this country at least, the courts
have apparently interpreted the rule to embrace all three modes
of comparison.15
z2.

See i Best. Ev. (Ist Am. Ed.) 459, and authorities cited,
Doe v. Suckermore, supra, per Coleridge, J.;
Doe v. Newton, i Nev. & P. I (1836) ;

Strogther v. Lucas, 6 Pet. U. S. 763, 8 L. Ed. 573;
Moore v. U. S., 91 U. S. 27o, 23 L. Ed. 346;
Hazelton v. Union Bank, 32 Wis. 47,
and cases cited in the three next succeeding notes. The following ancient
documents have been held admissible as standards under the rule: Documents recorded and preserved as genuine-State v. Allen, 8 N. Car. 9, 9
Am. D. 616; Documents regularly preserved as genuine in a public officeHamilton v. Smith, 74 Conn. 374; Ancient deeds and muniments of title in
possession of witness-Brandt v. Brooks, 8 Wend. 426; Entries in a family
bible and old letters in possession of family-Sweigart v. Richards, 8 Pa.
426. See also Wynn v. Patterson, 9 Pet. 674; Stone v. Moore, (Tex. Cr.
App.) 48 S. W. 1097.
13.

Doe v. Suckermore, supra.

14.

See Doe d Jenkins v. Davies, io Q. B. 314, 16 L. J. Q. B. 218, II

Jur. 607;
Macombeei v. Scott, io Kan. 335;
McAllister v. McAllister, 7 B. Mon. 270, to the effect that the
instruments need not be ancient in the strict or technical sense (documents
thirty years old), so long as they are too old to be proved in the ordinary
way, as where there are no living witnesses to prove them.
See the civil codes of Cal., Oreg. and Mont., substituting twenty years
for thirty.
-5. That the comparison could be made and an opinion given by
non-experts familiar with the ancient standard. See Nicholson v. Eureka
Lumber Co., 156 N. Car. 59, 72 S. E. 86, 36 L. R. A. (N. S.) and note.
That the comparison could be made by the jury, see 3 Wigm. Ev. sec.
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SAME-WRITING HABITS-ORTHOGRAPHY.
Still another apparent exception to the rule of Doe vs.
Suckermore has been recognized that may be helpful to the court
or practitioner in those few states where the rule of that case
still substantially persists. It is that testimony may be given, even
where it involves documents otherwise irrelevant and dehors the
record, to show the writing habits of the alleged author as to
orthography and syntax as bearing on the probability or improbability of his authorship. This is not deemed to impinge upon
the rule forbidding "comparison of writings."
The so-called "Garfield-Morey Letter" for example contained
such errors in orthography that it obviously could not have been
written by a college graduate, a teacher and a great statesman
16 a
such as Gen. Garfield was.
As a learned writer says: "If, in the disputed instrument,
certain words are wrongly spelled, and it is a fact that the person
alleged to be the author misspells the same words whenever he
makes use of them, such facts tends to prove the authorship of
the disputed writing; the more numerous the misspelled words,
the more cogent the proof for the reason that while two or more
persons may misspell one word in the same manner, it is less
probable that they will misspell two or more words in the same
manner. If many words are misspelled, and proof can be made
of numerous instances in which such words have been used, and
1994. In North Carolina the jury were not permitted to make the comparison alone. It must be made by the aid of a witness familiar with the
ancient standard or by experts. See Nicholson v. Eureka Lumber Co.,

supra, and authorities cited.
A non-expert is not competent to testify from mere comparison of

ancient documents without previous familiarity with the standards. Jarvis
v. Vomerford, 116 N. Car. 147, 21 S. E. 302.
That the comparison could be made by scientific witnesses or experts
and their opinion given, see Doe v. Suckermore, supra, with which compare the Fitzwalter Peerage case, IO Cl. & F. 193, apparently overruled in
Crawford & L. Peerages, 2 H. L. Cas. 534. See also State v. Clinton,
67 Mo. 384; West v. State, 22 N. J. L. 241; Williams v. Conger, 125 U. S.
413, 8 Sup. 933; Pope v. Anthony, 29 Tex. Civ. App. 298, 68 S. W. 521;
Clark v. Wygatt, 15 Ind. 27r, 77 Am. D. go; Go-a v. Browning, 96 Ga. 421,
23 S. E. 832; McAllister v. McAllister, 7 B. Monr. 270. See also Clay v.
Robinson, 7 W. Va. 359, and Clay v. Alderson, Io W. Va. 49.
16a. As to this see Ames on Forgery, pp. 185, 187.
121
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it can be shown that the same words have always been misspelled
in the same manner, the identity of the authorship is shown
'
almost to a demonstration." 6b
Upon similar principles it has been held, even in states where
comparison of extrinsic writings is not allowed, that an extrinsic
writing may be brought in to show that the writing in question
is the exact or practically exact counterpart or facsimile of the
other, to prove that the disputed signature must have been forged
by some process of tracing either from the extrinsic writing or
from a common model, and that expert testimony on that point
7
is admissible.'
SAME-OTHER EXCEPTIONS TO RULE OF
EXCLUSION.
Finally, as a remaining apparent exception to the common
law rule excluding extrinsic standards of comparison, a witness
who is already familiar with the handwriting of a party by having seen him write, or otherwise than by mere comparison of
standards, may refresh his memory as to such writing by comparing the disputed document with extrinsic writings proved or ad16b. Article in 2 Mich. i Jour. 16, reprinted in 3 Jones Ev. sec. 635.
See also 3 Wigm. Ev. sec. 2024 and authorities cited. See also Brooks v.
Tichborn, 5 Exch. 929, 2o L. J. Exch. 69, 14 Jur. 1122; Pate v. People,
8 Ill. 644; State v. Freshwater,30 Utah 442, 85 Pac. 447, 116 Am. St. R.
853; Outlaw v. Hurdle, i Jones L. (N. Car.) 150. Evidence of this kind
should be addressed to the jury, and is not usually a proper subject for
expert opinion. Such an opinion should be based solely upon the writings
themselves and not upon his knowledge of the education and literary
attainments of the alleged writer, or partly upon these and partly upon
such knowledge. Throchmorton v. Holt, i8o U. S. 553.
17. Stitzel v. Miller, 250 IIl. 72, 95 N. E. 53, Ann. Cas. 1912 B. and

note, 34 L. R. A. (N. S.)

OO4 and note.

18. Burr v. Harper, Holt (N. P.) 42o;
Queen v. Shepherd, i Cox. Cr. Cas. 237;
White Sewing Mach. Co. v. Gordon, 124 Ind. 495, 19 Am. St. R.
lO9;
Nat. Bank v. Armstrong, 66 Md. 113, 59 Am. R. 156.
See also Smith v. Walton, 8 Gill, (Md.) 85.
Evidence rejected in McNair v. Comw., 26 Pa. St. 388, where the witness could speak only from comparison and not at all from recollection,
though he had seen the party write.
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mitted to be genuine, even at the trial, 1 8 or may use the latter to
corroborate his testimony.' 9
STATUTORY CHANGES-AMERICAN LAW.
Naturally, the common law of this country was substantially,
or at least in its main essentials, the common law of England as
above outlined, modified in some instances by earlier and sometimes inconsistent rulings. A few states, indeed, discarded it
without legislative aid as archaic, unreasonable and calculated to
defeat the ends of justice, and freely admitted extrinsic standards
properly proved for comparison by the jury and by witnesses, 20
and a number of courts, while excluding extrinsic standards
generally, have allowed comparison with such writings as are
conceded by the adverse party to be genuine, or the genuineness
of which he is estopped to deny, or the use of which, for some
21
other reason involves no danger of collateral issues.
ig. U. S. v. Lamed, 4 Cranch C. C. 312;
Hopkins v. Simmons, i Cranch C. C. 250;
Comw. Bank v. Haldeman, i Pens. & W. (Pa.) 16i;
Smith v. Fenner, i Gall. I7O, 175;
Comp. Power v. Frick, 2 Grant (Pa.) 3o5;
Clark v. Wyatt, 15 Ind. 271, 77 Am. D. go.
20. Lyon v. Lyman, 9 Conn. 55;
Adams v. Field, 21 Vt. 256;
Rowell v. Fuller, 59 Vt. 668, io Atl. 853;
St. v. Brown, 4 R. I. 528, 7o Am. D. 158;
University of Illinois v. Spalding, 71 N. H. 163, 62 L. R. A. 817;
Moody v. Rockwell, 17 Pick, (Mass.) 49o;
Hanriot v. Sherwood, 82 Va. I;
Hammond's Case, 2 Me. 33, II Am. D. 39;
Calkins v. State, 14 Oh. St. 222;
Moore v. Palmer, 14 Wash. 134, 44 Pac. 142.
In South Carolina comparison of extrinsic standards was allowed,
but only in aid of doubtful testimony.
State v. Ezekel, 33 S. Car. ir5, ii S. E. 635.
21.

See Chance v. Gravel Road Co., 32 Ind. 472;
Shorb v. Kinzie, ioo Ind. 429;
Dietz v. Grand Rapids Nat. Bank, 69 Mich. 287;
McComber v. Scott, io Kan. 335;
Morrison v. Porter,35 Minn. 425, 59 Am. R. 331;
Rose v. Springfield F. Nat. Bank, 91 Mo. 399, 6o Am. R. 258;
Morris v. Porter, 35 Minn. 425, 29 N. W. 54;
Turnstall v. Cobb, iog N. Car. 316;
123
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The law as laid down in Doe vs. Suckermore, persisted in
England, however, down to 1854, and has persisted in many of
our own States to a much later date. Indeed the prohibition
against extrinsic standards was not removed in the federal courts
until 1913. Generally now, the law with us is upon the same
general basis as was established in England by the Common Law
Procedure Act of 1854 (i7, x8 Vict. c. 125. Sec. 27), which
provides:
"Comparison of disputed writing with any writing proved to
the satisfaction of the judge to be genuine, shall be permitted to
be made by witnesses; and such writings and the evidence of witnesses respecting the same, may be submitted to the court and
jury as evidence of the genuineness, or otherwise of the writing
22
in dispute."

Jarvis v. Vanderford, 116 N. Car. 147;
Croom v. Sugg, II N. Car. 259;
Clay v. Alderson, io W. Va. 49;
Keyser v. Pickrell, 4 App. Cas. D. C. 198;
U. S. v. McMillan, 29 Fed. R. 247.
See also Moore v. United States, 91 U. S. 270, 21 L. Ed. 346;
Williams v. Conger, 125 U. S. 397, 31 L. Ed. 778, 8 Sup. Ct. R. 933.
That extrinsic writings may be compared by consent of parties, see
Titford v. Knott, 2 Johns. Cas. (N. Y.) 211;
Kammon v. Galloway, 2 Baxt. (Tenn.) 230.
22. By sec. io3 this enactment applies to all courts of civil jurisdiction and by 28 Vict. c. I8, sec. 1, 8, it is extended to criminal cases.
The Canadian statute is an exact copy of the English act. See Langley v.
Joudry, 13 Doam. L. R- 563 and note. By act of Congress approved Feb. 26,
1913, any admitted or proved handwriting is competent as a basis for comparison by witnesses or by the jury, court or judicial officer, where the
matter is in issue. This English statute has been construed to permit
comparison of the disputed writing not only with that of the alleged
writer but with that of the supposed forger. Cresswell v. Jackson, 4 F. &
F. 1, 5. Our own statute would doubtless admit of the same construction,
for it provides that "Comparison of any disputed instrument with any
writing proved to the satisfaction of the court to be the genuine handwriting of any person claimed on the trial to have made or executed the
disputed instrument or writing shall be permitted to be made by witnesses,
and such writings or the evidence respecting them may be submitted to
the court or jury," Wis. Stat. Sec. 4189a. Similar statutes have sometimes received a narrower construction. See comments on Peck v. Callaghan, in 3 Wigm. Ev. p. 2683 note. See also Powers v. McKenzie, go
Tenn. 167, I6 S. W. 559.
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The provision that preliminary proof of standards shall be
of the right to trial by
addressed to the judge is not a denial
23
jury, or an invasion of its province.
USE OF PHOTOGRAPHS-ENLARGEMENTS, ETC.
Despite these enactments one stumbling block may still
remain to the best and most efficient proof in handwriting cases,
for when photographic reproductions or enlargements are offered,
with or without the aid of the stereoscope, a few courts have so
dealt with them as to confirm the belief that the law is the last
24
science to profit by the progress of other sciences.
Generally, however, the courts have held them admissible
subject to proper proof that they are honestly and accurately
made, as can be readily done by the lenses in modem use, a
matter usually quite easy to verify by comparison with the originals themselves. They should be, and usually are, taken to be
just what they are-mechanical aids, like the spectacles of judge
or the jury or a glass held in the hand, to the discovery and
25
elucidation of the truth.
23. Powers v. McKenzie, go Tenn. 167, 16 S. W. 559, and note in 62
L. R. A. 871. The statutes of the several states, and many of the more or
less conflicting rulings under or independent of them, are given in 3 Wigm.
Ev. §§ 2008, 2016, in the notes and the notes to 62 L. R. A. 832 et seq.
24. See matter of Foster, 34 Mich. 21, 23, with which compare
McLean v. Scripps, 52 Mich. 214, 219;

Taylor Will Case, io Abb. Pr. (N. S.) 300;
Tome v. ParkersburgBranch R. Co., 39 Md. 36, 17 Am. R. 54o;
Buzard v. McAluulty, 77 Tex. 438, 14 S. W. 138.
See also Hynes v. McDermott, 82 N. Y. 41, 50;
Houston v. Blythe, 60 Tex. 5o6;
People v. Van Alstyne, 57 Mich. 69.
25. One court aptly speaks of enlarged photographs in such cases as
"only a more enduring form of exhibiting the signatures to the jury as
under a magnifying glass." First Nat. Bank v. Wisdom's Ex'rs., iii Ky.
63, 63 S. W. 461 (igol). See also Frank v. Chemical Nat. Bank, 5 Jones
& S. 26, 5 N. Y. Sup. Ct. (1874) aff. 84 N. Y. 2o9; I Wigm. Ev. sec. 797.
Luco v. United States, 23 How (U. S.) 515, I6 L. Ed. 545; U. S. v. Oritz,
176 U. S. 422, 44 L. Ed. 539, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 466, following Marcy v.
Barnes, 16 Gray 161, 77 Am. D. 405; Rowell v. Fuller, 59 Vt. 688, io At.
853; State v. Ready, 77 N. J. L. 329. As to the use of the microscope,
see Bridgman v. Corey's Est. 62 Vt. i, 20 Atl. 273. Traced copies have
generally been excluded. See Howard v. Russell, 75 Tex. 171, 12 S. W.
525; White Sewing Machine Co. v. Gordon, 124 Ind. 495.
125
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Furthermore the use of photographs in a protracted trial,
where the questioned handwriting or available standards may
suffer obliteration or defacement through the necessity of frequent handling, may be almost essential to the ultimate ends of
justice.
Without attempting any exhaustive discussion of the subject,
photographs are admitted in handwriting cases (i) as secondary
evidence where the originals are lost or cannot be produced, upon
the same principles and under the same limitations that other
copies are admissible,2 6 or (2) as aids to the understanding and
elucidation of the appearance and character of things already
received or described in evidence, upon the same general principle
as pictures, drawings, maps, plats and plans are so received,
subject to the same preliminary proofs by the photographer,
draftsman or other competent person as to their accuracy or
exactness.2 7 Such proof is addressed to the sound discretion of
Goldsboro v. Cent. R. R. Co., 6o N. J. L. 49, 37 Atl. 433;
Leathers v. Salver Wrecking Co., 2 Wood, (U. S.) 68o.
See also the note to Hampton v. Norfolk & W. R. Co. in 35 L. R. A.
811; Fuller v. Robinson, 23o Mo. 22, 13o S. W. 343, Anno. Cas. I912A, 938;
Re Hayes-Cal.-135 Pac. 449; McLean v. Scripps, 52 Mich. 214, 17 N. W.
8r5, 18 N. W. 2og.
26.

State v. Ready, 77 N. J. L. 329;
Davidson v. St. Louis, etc., R. Co., 164 Mo. App. 7or, 148 S.
W. 4o6.
See notes to Gambill v. Schooley in 63 L. R. A. 438; Diederichs v. R. Ro. and Hampton v. R. Co., 35 L. R. A. 8o2;
U. S. v. Ortis, 176 U. S. (1899);
Sharon v. Hill, 26 Fed. R. 337, 358, per Deady, J.;
27.

People v. Mooney, 132 Cal. 13, 63 Pac. ro7o;

Marcy v. Barnes, i6 Gray (Mass.) 16r, per Merreck, J.;
First Nat. Bank v. Wisdom's Exzrs., ii Ky. 135, 63 S. W. 461;
Greer v. Missouri Lumber Co., 134 Mo. 85, 34 S. W. lO99, 56 Am.
St. R. 489 and note.
Photographs should not, of course, be admitted alone as primary
evidence or for expert comparison where the originals are or can be
produced.
Hynes v. McDermott, 82 N. Y. 41, 50.
The readiness with which retouching, so common both in traced and
simulated forgeries, can be shown by photographic enlargements is well
recognized, and so in greater or less degree of erasures, line crossings,
folds and many other facts and peculiarities.
See Rowell v.Fuller, 59 Vt. 688; Marcy v. Barnes, supra.

the court and its decision is, it seems, not subject to review if it
28
has any reasonable ground of support.
These principles would seem to apply to the use by experts
of the stereoscopeon, or even the blackboard and other devices,
to illustrate the peculiarities, likenesses, differences and other
29
facts upon which their opinions are based.
PROOFAND ADMISSION OF EXTRINSIC STANDARDS.
Naturally, where specimens not otherwise in the case as
genuine are brought into it as standards of comparison, under
statutes or otherwise, a proper foundation must be laid before
they can be used, or an expert or other opinion based upon a
comparison of them with the questioned document can be elicited.
Generally their genuineness must be established by admission or
estoppel, 30 or else by proof to the satisfaction of the presiding
judge,3 1 by testimony so clear and positive as to enable him to
28. Mauch v. Hartford, II2 Wis. 40;
Goldsboro v. Central R. R. Co., 6o N. J. L. 49, 37 Ad. 433;
Crane v. Dexter-Horton Co., 5 Wash. 497.
See also the note to Ligon v. Allen, 51 L. R. A. (N. S.) p. 848;
People v. Bird, 124 Cal. 32, 1i Am. Cr. Rep. 442.
29. McKay v. Lasher, i21 N. Y. 479 (blackboard).
In State v. Ready, 77 N. J. 329, it was held that the fact that the
photographs offered exhibited the signatures on ruled squares (a common
device with the expert) did not destroy their admissibility. "No one,"
said Reed, J., "will, I think, dispute that a glass, plain or with magnifying
powers, marked with lines so as to afford a measure of space and standard
of proportion, could have been put into the hands of the jury for the purpose of applying it to the signatures, whether of a written size or a magnified size. It would amount to no more than applying a measure to the
signatures, and then viewing the measure and the signatures through a
glass." See generally Ligon v. Allen, 157 Ky. ioi, 162 S. W. 536, 51 L. R.
A. (N. S.) 842, note.
3o. The admission must ordinarily be judicial, i. e., for the purposes of the trial or in the pleadings.
Jones v. State, 6o Ind. 241;
Van Sickle v. People, 29 Mich. 61;
McCombs v. Foster, 62 Mo. App. 303.
Generally this estoppel arises where a party claims under the document offered as a standard by his adversary. Keyser v. Pickrell,4 App.
D. C. 198. Admissions by the party seeking to usq the writing are inadmissible, Sorb v. McKenzie, 8o Ind. 500.
31. The decision of the court on this preliminary question is final
and conclusive, unless it appears to have been based upon an erroneous
idea of legal principles.
State v. Thompson, 8o Me. 194, 13 Atl. 892, 6 Am. St. P. 172;
Costello v. Crowell, 139 Mass. 588, 2 N. E. 698;
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rule .practically as a matter of law that the standards are
genuine.3 2 And it should be remembered that in most states the
standards cannot be proved by comparison of experts or others,
under the rule requiring direct and positive testimony to the
33
fact of genuineness.
This is sometimes construed to mean that the standards must
be established by those who saw the party write, or by his admission that he wrote such standards, or by estoppel. 34 a But the
true rule doubtless is that they may be circumstantially established by other means than a comparison with other writings;
hence that the party recognized a writing by paying money on
34
it, would ordinarily be sufficient. b
Writings specially prepared by a party in or out of court
for use as standards at the trial will usually be held inadmissible,
as they may obviously be unfairly made and be in the nature of
self-serving evidence, made for the occasion post litem motam.3 5
Shannon v. Castner, 21 Pa. Super. Ct. 294.
32. Sankey v. Coon, 82 Ia. 125, 47 N. W. 1077;
Winch v. Noonan, 65 Ia. 186, 21 N. W. 511;

Hyde v. Woolfolk, Ia. 159;
State v. Stegman, 62 Kan. 476, 63 Pac. 746;
Bell v. Brewster, 44 Oh. St. 69o, IO N. E. 678;
Parvey v. Parvey, 30 Oh. St. 600;
University of Illinois v. Spalding, ii N. H. 163, 51 At. 73r;
Costello v. Crowell, 133 Mass. 152.

In People v. Molineaux, 168 N. Y. 264, 68 N. E. 286, 62 L. R. A. 193,
it was held that the standards must be proved by a fair preponderance of
the evidence in civil cases, and in criminal cases beyond a reasonable doubt.
33. Rogers Expert Testimony, sec. 138, 3 Wigm. Ev. sec. 2o2o.
Sankey v. Coon, 82 Ia. 125, 47 N. W. l077.

Contra in New York People v. Molineaux, 168 N. Y. 264, 61 N.
E. 286, 62 L. R. A. 193;
McKay v. Lasher, 121 N. Y. 477, 24 N. E. 711.
34a. Rogers Expert Testimony, sec. 138.
Martin v. Maguire, 7 Gray (Mass.) 177;
Sperry v. Tebbs, 20 Oh. L. J. 181 (1888).
34b. Little v. Rogers, 99 Ga. 95, 24 S. E. 856.
35- See 3 Jones Com. Ev. sec. 55o.
King v. Donahue, iio Mass. 155, 14 Am. R. 589;
Williams v. State, IoO Ala. 33;
State v. Koontz, 31 W. Va. 129, 5 S. E. 328;

People v. De Kroyft, 49 Hun. 71.
Even a signed answer in the same cause by the party offering it has
been excluded under this rule.
Shorb v. Kenzie, ioo Ind. 429.
Compare Singer Mfg. Co. v. McFarland, 53 Ia. 540, 5 N. W. 739.
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But standards written in the presence of the jury, by direction of the judge, in the exercise of a sound legal discretion
have been held proper. 36
Clearly a writing done at the request of the adverse party
on cross-examination, is a proper standard in the case against the
37
party requesting it.
But even in among the jurisdictions that retain generally
the orthodox rule as laid down in Doe vs. Suckermore, and Doe
vs. Newton, forbidding the comparison of writings not otherwise
in the case, the phrases "writings in the case" or "writings otherwise in evidence," has by many of our courts been held to include,
not merely writings in evidence as relevant to the issues, but such
other writings as constitute a part of the files or record proper,
as the signatures to affidavits, bail bonds, undertakings for costs,
and the like.3 8 Certainly as to these there is little if any risk
of collateral issues.
Failure to object to standards when offered is taken to be an
admission of their genuineness, and a subsequent objection comes
too late. 3 9 But it has been held that the standards are not suffi36. Hickory v. United States, 151 U. S. 303, 38 L. Ed. 170;
Smith v. King, 62 Conn. 515, 26 Atl.;
King v. Donahue, supra.
See also Williams v. Riches, 77 Wis. 569, 46 N. W. 817;
First Nat. Bank v. Robert, 41 Mich. 7o9, 3 N. W. 199.
See also Osbourne v. Hosier, 6 Mod. 167.
37. 3 Jones Com. on Ev. sec. 55o. In Smith v. King, 62 Conn. 516,
26 Atl. io5g, it was held that the court had power in the exercise of its
discretion, to direct the witness to write. See Williams v. Riches, supra.
38. Mississippi Lumber Co. v. Kelly, ig S. D. 577, 104 N. W. 265;
People v. Parker, 67 Mich. 222, 34 N. W. 72o;
Lachance z. Loeblein, 15 Mo. App. 46o;
Tucker v. Hyatt, 144 Ind. 635, 41 N. E. 1047;
Tower v. Whip, 53 W. Va. r58, 63 L. R. A. 937;
McCaffrey v. Hentage, 5 Houst. Del. 22o;
Comp. Springer v. Hall, 83 Mo. 693 53 Am. R. 598;
Shorb v.Kenzie, ioo Ind. 429;
in both of which cases they were rejected as standards of comparison on
account of the danger that they might be self-serving. See also on this
point 9 Ann. Cas. 452.
See, however, Snow v. Wiggin, i Ill. App. 542; Frank v. Taubman,
31 Ill. App. 592, with which compare Marsey v. Farmers' Bank, o4
Ill. 327.
39.

Sanderson v. Osgood, 52 Vt. 309;
Shaw v. Bryant, go Hun 374, 384.
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ciently proved by mere admissions of the party offering them, for
they may not be his writing at all, or they might have been made
with a view to subserve his interests, 40 and their admission would
tend to the production of collateral issues.
WHO DEEMED HANDWRITING EXPERTS.
Having considered the admissibility and basis of expert
testimony in handwriting cases, it remains to be seen who is an
expert. The rule as to those who are familiar with the handwriting of the party by reason of their familiarity gained by seeing
him write, or by business or social correspondence involving
undoubtedly genuine writings or the custody of ancient documents
are hence in some special sense experts, having been already
considered, we may define an expert in a wider and more proper
sense as one who, by reason of special study, observation and
experience is, or may reasonably be presumed to be, qualified to
form a more intelligent and trustworthy opinion than the average
of men, as to the authorship or authenticity of handwriting, upon
the basis of knowledge acquired or standards examined and compared for the particular occasion.
It should be noted here that the ability of the expert to draw
correct conclusions, or indeed any conclusions at all in some
cases, depends largely upon the number and character of the
standards submitted to him, and his ability to demonstrate those
conclusions in court is subject to the same conditions. Indeed
the conscientious expert will decline to venture his judgment or
to testify in court at all, unless there is sufficient data to warrant
a demonstrable opinion. The specimens, also should be as nearly
contemporaneous with the disputed writing as practicable, and if
possible should be executed under the same or similar conditions.
Counsel should therefore be diligent in obtaining a sufficient
number of legally admissible standards of this description. 41
While comparatively few in this country make it their entire
or principal business to examine and pass upon questioned documents, still we have experts of a high order of intelligence and
skill, who make the solution of handwriting problem partly or
40.

Dowd v. Reid, 53 Mo. App. 553;
Bank of Comw. v. Mudgett, 44 N. Y. 514 and cases supra, note 38.

41.

Osborn Ques. Doc. (igio), p. I8.
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wholly a vocation. Such is Mr. John F. Tyrell of Milwaukee,
who has appeared in many important cases and to whom the
writer is indebted for many valuable suggestions, and Mr. Albert
S. Osborne of New York, the author of a most scholarly work
on questioned documents from which the writer has received
great aid, and there are no doubt many others.
And it is well to note here that many persons can qualify so
that their testimony as experts is legally admissible, whose opinions should still be entitled to little weight Indeed the faker,
the charlatan, and the paid partisan are not unknown in this
department of legal investigation; and finally we have the socalled "gaphologist" whose deliberate pretense or blind infatuation leads him to assert that he can find in handwriting such
indications as love of animals, sterility in the male or female, or
functional disturbance of the bowels. People who make such
claims as these should not be confused with the honest, intelligent
and painstaking handwriting expert, who attempts to do no more
than he can fairly demonstrate, and fairly demonstrates what he
honestly believes.
In order that his opinion may be admitted at all, the witness
must qualify, for if he has no special knowledge or skill in matters of handwriting, and no previous familiarity with the hand
of the supposed writer, the jury are deemed to be as competent
as he to form an opinion, and it is for them to perform that duty.
42
In short, he must bring himself within the opinion rule.
Whether he has done so or not is a preliminary question for
the judge and not the jury to decide in the exercise of a sound
43
legal discretion as applied to the circumstances of each case,
and like the question of the admissibility of standards, it is not
usually subject to review except for plain and palpable disregard
44
of legal principles, amounting to an abuse of judicial discretion.
42. Page v. Homans, 14 Me. 482;
Spottiswood v. Wier, 8o Cal. 448, 22 Pac. 289;
McKay v. Lasher, 42 Hun. 270.

This is true under modern statutes.
Mixer v. Bennett, 70 Ia. 329, 3o N. W. 587.
43. Forgey v. Bank, 66 Ind. 125. Fairbanks v. Hugson, 58 Cal. 314,
-and cases in the next note below. Comp. Vinton v. Peck, 14 Mich. 287.
44. Comw. v. Nefus, 135 Mass. 533;
Marcy v. Barnes, 16 Gray. 16l, 77 Am. D. 4o5;
Powers v. McKenzie, 90 Tenn. 167, 16 S. W. 559;
State v. David, 131 Mo. 380. 33 S. W. 28, Steel Co. Ann. Cas.
1912D 817.
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The rulings of the courts in particular cases are therefore
to be regarded as suggestive rather than as establishing fixed
precedents for accepting or rejecting the witness.
Among those whose special knowledge and experience has
been held to qualify them as experts in the narrow sense to
authenticate or disauthenticate a document, we have the following: A writing master professing skill in detecting forgery,4 5
an experienced bank teller or cashier,4 6 who is of course competent to testify as to the genuineness of bank bills that he has
been accustomed to handle, 4 7 or generally as to disputed signatures, or to say whether a particular writing shown him has been
altered, 48 or whether a writing on an erasure was done before
or after the body of the note.4 9 A clerk in the postoffice accustomed to inspect franks to detect forgeries has been likewise held
competent on the question of disputed handwriting. 5 0 Skilled
engravers have usually been held so competent, particularly where
the genuineness of dyes or seals is involved, 51 and .an expert
repairer of typewriters has been admitted on a question of peculiarities of typewritten work. 5 2 A treasurer and clerk of a railroad company accustomed to examining signatures on stock and
bank bills in order to determine their genuineness, 5 3 and a photographer accustomed to examining handwriting in connection with
his business in order to detect forgeries have been held experts. 54
Upon principle, indeed, all that seems necessary is that the party
should have made such special study of handwriting or have had
such a large experience in examining and comparing hands or
signatures or other features of documents, as to make his opinion
or inference a probable aid to the jury. But it has been held that
a witness does not show himself qualified by stating merely that
he is clerk of the courts, without stating also his length of service
Moody v. Rowell, 28 Am. D. 317.
People v. Hewitt, 2 Park. Cr. R. (N. Y.) 20.
Johnson v. State, 35 Ala. 37o.
Pate v. People, 3 Gilm. (Ill.) 644.
Dubois v. Baker, 40 Barb. (N. Y.) 556.
Goodtitle v. Graham, 4 term R. 497;
King v. Cator, 4 Esp. 187.
5I. Folkes v. Chadd, 3 Dong. 157.
45.
46.
47.
48.
4g.
5o.

52.
53.

See State v. Freshwater, 30 Utah 442, 85 Pac. 447.
Withee v. Rowe, 45 Me. 571.

54. Marcy v. Barnes, 16 Gray 161, 77 Am. D. 405.
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in that capacity;55 nor is the mere occasional comparison of
disputed signatures in the course of business enough;56 nor is
57
mere skill in the use of the microscope.
Disclaimer of expertness, however, does not necessarily
58
require the rejection of the witness.
Among those whose testimony as experts has been rejected
we sometimes find bank officers or clerks, but in such cases, unlike
tellers or cashiers, the witness usually had no special experience
in comparing writings. 59 Merchants have been rejected under
similar circumstances, 60 and so have lawyers, 61 and conveyancers. 6 2 Bookkeepers and others whose experience in such
matters would seem to be but little if any more than is acquired
by most persons in business or professional life have been rejected, they having made no special study of the subject-of handwriting particularly as to its comparison or identification. Indeed,
as we have already said, proof of expertness is addressed to the
judge and his decision will stand unless it clearly appears to
involve an erroneous view of legal principles or is not justified
63
by the evidence.
NON-EXPERT OPINION-QUALIFICATIONS
OF WITNESS.
When a non-expert witness is offered to give an opinion from
having seen the party write, he has been held sufficiently qualified
55.
56.
See
57.

Winch v. Norman, 65 Iowa 186, 21 N. W. 5II.
Spottiswood v. Weir, 8o Cal. 448, 22 Pa. 289.
also People v. Spooner, i Den. 343, 43 Am. D. 672.
State v. Ward, 39 Vt. 225;
Stevenson v. Gunning's Est., 64 Vt. 6oi, 25 Ad. 697.
58. Tower v. Whip, 53 W. Va. 158, 63 L. R. A. 939 and cases cited
on the note thereto at page 941.
Contra Heacock v. State, 13 Tex. App. 97.
And see generally on the competency of witnesses in handwriting
cases, note to Tower vs. Whip, 63 L. R. A. 939, and 3 Wigm. Ev. § ioi2,
note 3; Lawson Expert Ev. (2nd Ed.) 455.
59. Sed Stone v. Hubbard, Cushing (Mass.) 595;
Pate v. People, 8 Ill. 644;
Birmingham National Bank v. Bradley, 18 Ala. 2o5, i9 So. 791.
6o. Edmonstone v. Hubbard, 45 Mo. App. 346.
6i. Hyde v. Woolfolk, i Ia. i59;
State v. Phair, 48 Vt. 366.
62. Vinton v. Peck, 14 Mich. 287.
63. Comw. v. Nefus, 135 Mass. 533;
Nunes v. Perry, 113 Mass. 274;
State v. David, 131 Mo. 380, 33 S. W. 28.
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though he has seen him write but once and that only a little,
and many years before, though necessarily under such circum64
stances, his testimony is not entitled to much weight.
Where, however, his alleged familiarity with the particular
hand is based upon his having seen other alleged writings of the
party, their genuineness must be satisfactorily established. If
the writer has acknowledged them expressly, or impliedly by
acting upon them as genuine, that is usually held sufficient. 65
When knowledge of the standard is claimed to have been
acquired by correspondence, however, it is well settled that the
mere proof of receipt of letters or papers purporting to have
been written by him whose writing is in dispute, 66a is not enough.
But it is generally held enough, that he has received such letters
or documents in reply to communications written by himself or
by his authority,66b or even that he has acted upon them as
authentic.67 Neither need the witness be the sendee or recipient of
the papers. He may be a mere clerk or custodian or have seen
them in any other way. It is enough that he has seen them and
that their genuineness has been satisfactorily proved. It is sufficient in other words that his mental standard is based upon visual
familiarity with a genuine writing. 68
It has even been held in England, prior to the statute, that
one whose familiarity with the handwriting in dispute was by
seeing it on an affidavit filed in the case, was competent to give
an opinion, 6 9 and it is no disqualification that the witness has

64. See Eagleton v. Kingston, 8 Ves. Jr. 438, i5 Encyclo. L. (2nd
Ed.) 255, note 4, 256, notes I and 2. 3 Jones, Com. Ev. sec. 546.
65. Johnson v. Daverne, ig Johns. (N. Y.) 134, IO Am. D. 198;
Gordon v. Price, io Ired. L. (32 N. Car.) 385.
66a. Pinkham v. Cockrell, 77 Mich. 265, 43 N. W. 921;
White Sezing Mach. Co. v. Gordon, 124 Ind. 495, 19 Am. St.

R. io9.
66b. See 3 Jones Com. Ev. sec. 547 and cases cited in note 76 and in
the note to Lancaster vi. Ames, 17 L. R. A. (N. S.) 229.
Parker v. Amazon Insurance Co., 34 Wis. 363.
67. Thorpe v. Grisbourne, 2 Car. & P. 21;

Harrisonv. Fry, R. & M. 9o, I Car. & P. 289, 2 Bing. I79.
68. Rex v. Slaney, 5 Car. & P. 213.
69.

Smith v. Sainsbury, 5 Car. & P. 196.
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refreshed his memory by the perusal of genuine specimens,
70
though such specimens are not in evidence.
EXAMINATION OF HANDWRITING WITNESSESWEIGHT TO BE ACCORDED TESTIMONY.
Of the weight to be accorded testimony of witness in handwriting cases and the tests to be applied to it by the court and
counsel much has been said and much more might be added.
We are forced, however, to content ourselves with some general
observations here, leaving more to be gathered from the discussion of the practical side of the expert's work which is necessarily
postponed to another issue. Of course the direct and positive
testimony of a single intelligent, credible and disinterested witness that he saw the very writing done is almost always conclusive, particularly where he is an attesting witness: But where
the witness testifies from memory as to the writing characteristics of the party (from mere knowledge of the type) his
testimony may be entitled to much weight or little depending
upon how extensive his observations have been and how recent,
relatively to the origin of the disputed writing, and his ability
to see and observe depending on occupation, education and experience. All these are of course proper matters both for direct
and cross-examination.
When we come to the expert in the ordinary sense, his
qualifications may clearly be gone into on cross-examination, not
for the purpose of disqualifying him unless this can be done
utterly so that his testimony may be stricken out, but in order to
minimize the weight that might otherwise be given to his opinion.
Furthermore, in testing his knowledge and judgment much
latitude has been allowed. It has even been held that on crossexamination any writings or parts of writings may be exhibited
to him for that purpose, and that neither the expert nor counsel
calling him is entitled to know beforehand what writings will be
so used, or whether they are genuine or not.7 1 Even spurious
70.

71.

See Remington Paper Co. v. O'Dougherty, 81 N. Y. 474;
Miller v. Coulter, 156 Ind. 260, 59 N. E. 853 and cases cited
supra notes 18, *19.
Travelers' Ins. Co. v. Sheppard, 85 Ga. 251, 12 S. E. 17;

Johnsot Harvester Co. v. Muller, 72 Mich. 265, 16 Am. R. 536,
40 N. W. 429.

But see Gaunt v. Harkness, 53 Kan. 405, 36 Pac. 739, 42 Am. St. P,
297 and note.
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writings prepared for the occasion have been admitted on crossexamination for the purpose of discrediting the witness by hav72
ing him pronounce them genuine.
Both of the procedures above indicated are on the whole
often unfair to the witness unless, indeed, he is given a reasonable time under decent conditions to examine the material thus
submitted. This the exigencies of the trial will not always
permit.

73

The weight to be accorded to the testimony handwriting
experts as a class has elicited various judicial utterance. Naturally, the older of these are for the most part less favorable
to it than the comparatively recent. It has been declared even
recently, however, to be "of the lowest order," 7 4 "weak and
unsatisfactory," and the like, 7 5 and instructions embodying this
idea have been upheld in Iowa and Vermont, 7 6 though such
72.

Hoag v. Wright, 174 N. Y. 36, 63 L. R. A. 163, 66 N. E. 579;
First Nat. Bank v. Allen, ioo Ala. 476, 46 Am. St. Rep. 80, 27 L.
R. A. 426, 14 South 335;

Johnston Harvester Co. v. Miller, 72 Mich. 265, 16 Am. St. Rep.
536, 4o N. W. 429;

Browning v. Gosnell, 91 Iowa 448, 59 N. W. 34o;
Contra: Gaunt v. Harkness, 53 Kan. 405, 42 Am. St. Rep. 297,
36 Pac. 739;
Howard v. Patrick, 43 Mich. 121, 5 N. W. 84.
See also Tyler v. Todd, 36 Conn. 218;
Andrews v. Hayden, 88 Ky. 455, 11 S. W. 428.
This last course at least is almost universally condemned when applied
to non-experts (Pierce v. Northey, 14 Wis. Io, and note in 63 L. R. A.
171 et seq.), unless, perhaps, the test writing is first admitted or proved
to be genuine.
See First Nat. Bank v. Hyland, 53 Hun io8, 6 N. Y. Supp. 87.
Where an expert commits an error in attempting to distinguish between genuine and spurious writing, such error may, unless he acknowledges it, be shown by other testimony. Hoag v. Wright, supra; overruling
People v. Murphy, 135 N. Y. 450, 32 N. E. 138. Contra: Rose v. Bank, 91
Mo. 399, 6o Am. R. 268; Gaunt v. Harkness, supra, Massey v. Bank, 104
Ill. 327; Tyler v. Todd, supra.

73. See the approximately fair procedure in Bishop Atterbury's Trial,
16 How. St. Tr. 571. See alio Demerritt v. Randall, 116 Mass. 331.
74. Patton v. Lund, 114 Ia. 201, 86 N. W. 296, and cases cited.
75. Browning v. Goshnell, 9I Ia. 448, 59 N. W. 340.
76. Pratt v. Rawson, 40 Vt. 183, 188. In the federal courts it seems
proper to instruct that such evidence should be received with caution.
U. S. v. Pendergast,32 Fed. Rep. 198.
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instructions are usually justly condemned elsewhere as invading
77
the province of the jury.
The judicial distrust of handwriting testimony by experts
is partly due to the occasional partisanship of such witnesses,
which is usually no more and no less than that of privately paid
experts in other departments of knowledge; and partly to a failure to appreciate the real value of the service that the really
capable and conscientious expert can render, not only in discovering the truth but in bringing it to the understanding. And
conceding that, in addition to the tendency to partisanship, the
handwriting expert may also be "affected by that pride of opinion
and that kind of mental fascination with which men are affected
when engaged in what they call scientific inquiries," 78 it is doubtful if he is any more prone to it than are other professional or
scientific witnesses. Perhaps the chief criticism of this class of
witnesses in their inclination to regard their so-called science
as exact and to exhibit too much confidence both in its possibilities and in their own conclusions. It is doubtful, however, on the
whole, whether their professional enthusiasm, pride of opinion,
self-confidence or partisanship have hung, imprisoned, disgraced
or impoverished more innocent people, in proportion to the number of cases in which they have appeared, than have similar
traits in the medical men, the professional alienists and the professors of chemistry and experts in toxicology, in whose society
79
the handwriting specialists are sometimes compelled to work.
Yet the bond of sympathy between these several classes of
experts should be strong, for they have all come in for their full
share of judicial condemnation upon identical or similar grounds.
We therefore omit the favorable or lauditory expressions of
courts and judges as applied to handwriting experts with the
remarks that they are quite or nearly as strong as those of an
opposite character. 80
77. Coleman v. Adair, 75 Miss. 66o;
Davis v. Lambert, 69 Neb. 242, 95 N. W. 592.
78. See the dissenting opinion of O'Brien, J., in People v. Patrick,
182 N. Y. 131, 74 N. E. 843.
79. See People v. Molineux, i68 N. Y. 264, 68 N. E. 286, 62 L. R.
A. 193.
8o. Both classes of expressions are given in i Moore on Facts, sec.
615 et seq. and particularly in secs, 629, 63o. See also 3 Wigm. Ev. sec.
2o26. Rogers' Expert Testimony, 199 et seq. to the relative value of.
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As to the relative values of the testimony of the non-expert
who has seen the party write, or has become otherwise familiar
with his writing, and has thus acquired a mental standard for
comparison, and that of the expert who speaks from comparison
or juxtaposition alone, much has been said and much more might
be added. Those who have seen a flock of tottering, toothless
veterans who have acquired their mental standards many years
before, and have listened to their conflicting and uncertain testimony, will usually look for better assistance than theirs in a close
or doubtful case. That their testimony should neutralize or outweigh that of a single honest and intelligent expert speaking
from comparison with adequate proved standards is inconceivable. That an intelligent lawyer or business man should err as
to the signature of his partner of long standing is possible but
not probable. That the trained expert should err at least as to
a writing of any considerable length, when speaking from juxtaposition of numerous fairly contemporaneous standards is also
possible but not probable. That the testimony of an expert so
speaking should be inferior to that of one who speaks from a
mental standard or exemplar formed by seeing the party write
but once twenty years before, is ridiculous. We therefore dismiss
the discussion as likely to bring us for practical purposes to the
uttermost confines of nowhere, unless it is directed to the facts of
some concrete case, contenting ourselves with a quotation from a
Canadian decision. "It seems plain that a more correct judgment
as to the identity of handwriting would be formed by a witness
[expert] by a critical and minute comparison with a fair and
genuine specimen of the party's handwriting than by a comparison of seen signatures with the faint impressions produced by
having seen the party Write, and even then perhaps under circumstances which did not awaken his attention." 81
Most important of all to bear in mind, both as a basis for
the examination and cross-examination of experts and for argument upon the weight of their testimony is, that the opinion of an
expert is valuable only when it points out satisfactory reasons for
his conclusion. A bare expression of opinion, unless supported
81. Badgley, J., in Ried v. Warner, 17 L. C. Rep. 491. See to similar
effect Woodnan v. Dana, 52 Me. 9, 14; Chance v. Indianapolis,etc., Co.,
32 Ind. 472, 474; Green v. Terwalliger, 56 Fed. 384.
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by intelligent reasons is entitled to little weight,8 2 and the writer
willingly concedes, as will any competent expert, the justice of
nearly all of the judicial utterances derogatory to the value of
testimony of handwriting experts as a class, provided such utterances are confined to such testimony when consisting of a mere
unreasoned and undemonstrated opinion.
The fact is as stated by the Supreme Court of Mississippi:
"The evidence of experts (in handwriting) is neither intrinsically weak nor intrinsically strong; its value depends upon the
character, capacity, skill, opportunities of observation, the state
of mind of the expert himself on the nature of the case, and of

its weight and worth the jury must judge without any influencing
instruction, either weakening or strengthening from the court."83
The courts, therefore, are practically unanimous in holding
that the expert, where it is competent for him to give an opinion
at all, should be allowed to testify as to the grounds or reasons
upon which it is based, and to point out and explain to the jury
the differences, similarities or other peculiarities of the document
which induce his belief,84 and a careful examiner will bring out
the full strength of a competent expert in this regard, by a few
well directed questions.
Finally, in handwriting cases, there is no distinction under
the rule requiring "best evidence" as to the admissibility of the
testimony of experts and non-experts even though the latter claim
to have seen the very writing in question executed. The testimony of witnesses of one class may either corroborate, rebut or
discredit the testimony of a witness of another class.
82. See in re Burtis Will, 89 N. Y. 441, 43 Misc. R. 437. In re
Gammell, xg Nova Scotia 265, 279; Hawkins v. Grimes, 13 B. Mon (Ky.)
257, 262; Gordon's Case, 5o N. J. Eq. 397, 26 Atl. 2(68; Keith v. Lothrop,
io Cush. (Mass.) 457; Kindalrs Ex'rs. v. Collier, 79 Ky. 446. That a
mere unreasoned expert opinion is not sufficient, standing alone, on which
to base findings of fact, see Re Koch, 33 Misc. i53, 68 N. Y. Supp. 375.
83. Coleman v. Adair, 75 Miss. 66o (1898). See also remarks of
Chancellor McGill in Gordon's Case, supra, with which compare the
opinion of Surrogate Hutchins in the Taylor Will Case, io Abb. Pr. N.

S. (N. Y.) 309.

84. People v. Mooney,

132 Cal. 13, 63 Pac. io7o;
People v. Bird, x24 Cal. 32, 56 Pac. 639;
Koons v. State, 36 Ohio' St. 195;
Mallory v. Farmers' Ins. Co., go Mich. 112.
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PAPER, INK, ETC-ALTERATIONS AND
ILLEGIBLE WRITING.
On principle, and generally upon authority, even where
the older common law rule forbidding the comparison of writings prevails, there is no objection to expert testimony as to
paper, ink, type, erasures, illegible words or characters, and the
like, as shedding light upon the age, authenticity or contents of
an instrument or some part of it. Clearly this does not constitute comparison of writings in any strict or proper sense. 8 5
Whether the opinion of an expert should be received that a
document is a spurious or in a feigned hand from mere inspection or examination without juxtaposition with any standard,
seems at least on the older decisions quite doubtful.
PRESERVATION AND PRELIMINARY USE OF
QUESTIONED DOCUMENTS
The fact that the present article has already extended far
beyond the limits originally planned, makes it necessary to postpone the expert's side of the discussion until a later issue. We
close it therefore with a few practical suggestions. The moment
a document is questioned it should be handled and preserved with
the greatest care. Its present physical condition should be carefully observed and noted in writing, and above all it should not
be cut, torn or mutilated in any way, or unavoidably creased or
folded, particularly in any new place, or subjected to heat or
moisture or to the action of chemicals, except in expert hands.
If it is much worn it may, if not too large, be preserved between
two pieces of glass. Above all it should not be the subject of
In re Koch, 163, 68 N. Y. Supp. 375;
Kendall's Ex'rs. v. Collier, 97 Ky. 446; 30 S. W
Hawkins v. Grimes, 13 B. Mon. 254,
Patton v. Lund, 114 Ia. 201, 86 N. W 296

1002;

See also the liberal statute in Pennsylvania (P L. 69, sec. 3). See
also supra, notes 23 et seq.
85. See 3 Wigm. Ev. secs. 2023, 2024, 2025. On the question of inks,
a chemist or other expert in such matters, should of course, on primcple,
be permitted to testify after making the requisite tests. Expert testimony
that the style of penmanship indicated a different epoch has even been
held admissible where comparison of writings in the strict sense would
have been forbidden. Tracy Peerage Case, io Cl. & F I6I, r76.
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marks or erasures, nor should letter press copies be made of it, or
any tracings save by the gentlest and most skilful hand. Generally the earlier such documents reach the control of the court
or its custodians, the better.
Finally, counsel seeking the aid of an expert, should call
upon him as soon as the necessity appears in order that he may
have ample time within which to make his investigations and
prepare for trial. As Prof. Wigmore well observes, "It is preposterous to expect him invariably to obtain by a brief inspection
on the stand the necessary data for an opinion. Close measurements, detailed enlargement, and other expedients of the expert,
may often require not only a length of time but a quantity of
86
apparatus and a certain degree of seclusion."

CONTRIBUTION BETWEEN JOINT
TORT-FEASORS
CHAS. B. QUAnIts.*
With all the litigation in negligence cases and the greater
part of the cases tried in our courts is of this kind, it seems
strange indeed that the courts have not since long settled and
placed beyond dispute all questions as to the rights of persons
liable on joint tort- judgments.
But such is far from being true. The right of the judgment
creditor to enforce the judgment in solido against any of the
defendants is plain. But where one such judgment debtor has
been forced to pay more than his aliquot part of the liability,
what his rights are if any he has against the others, is very much
unsettled at least in the minds of most lawyers.
In the ordinary negligence case where there was no concert
of action and no real intent to do the plaintiff an injury, it is
obviously fair for each of the defendants to stand his proportionate share of the loss. But after such a judgment has been
86. 3 Ev. sec. 2oii.
* Member of the Milwaukee bar.
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